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UNITED STATES v. ROSES, INC.:
UNWELCOME RESTRAINTS ON THE
COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Dumping is defined as "the sale of commodities in a foreign
market at a price which is lower than the price or value of compa-
rable commodities in the country of their origin."' To discourage
dumping and to diminish its harmful effect on American producers
of the same product,2 Congress has enacted antidumping legisla-
' Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1190, 1194 (E.D. Pa.
1980); see J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3 (1966) (dumping de-
fined as "price-discrimination between national markets") (emphasis omitted); Myerson, A
Review of Current Antidumping Procedures: United States Law and the Case of Japan, 15
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 167, 169 (1976) (dumping occurs when "the export price of an item
is lower than the [exporting producer's] home market price"); Re, Litigation Before the
United States Court of International Trade, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 437, 451 (1981)
("dumping occurs whenever a foreign exporter charges a lower price for its merchandise
when sold in the United States than it charges when the same kind of merchandise is sold in
[its] home market").
For analytical purposes, dumping may be divided into three specific categories: spo-
radic, long-run or continuous, and short-run or intermittent. See J. VINER, supra, at 30; W.
WARES, THE THEORY OF DUMPING AND AMERICAN COMMERCIAL POLICY 9 (1977); Myerson,
supra, at 168. Sporadic dumping occurs when a producer disposes of surplus stock at re-
duced prices in foreign markets in order to maintain prices in its domestic market. See J.
VINER, supra, at 110-11. Generally, long-run dumping is a protracted attempt to maximize
profits by selling goods at a lower price in an "elastic," price-sensitive market, while main-
taining higher prices in the "inelastic," domestic market, where price decreases will not
cause immediate sales increases. See Fisher, The Antidumping Law of the United States: A
Legal and Economic Analysis, 5 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 85, 87-88 (1973); Myerson, supra,
at 168-69. Short-run dumping is used to meet competitors' prices, to develop trade connec-
tions in new markets, and to eliminate or suppress competition in an export market. See J.
VINER, supra, at 110. Although the efficacy of sporadic and long-term dumping is still being
debated, see Myerson, supra, at 169, there is agreement among commentators that short-
run dumping, when used for the elimination of competition, has a damaging impact on in-
ternational trade, see Ehrenhaft, Protection Against International Price Discrimination:
United States Countervailing and Antidumping Duties, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 44, 47 (1958);
Myerson, supra, at 171. After the competition has been eliminated, the dumping producer
often will raise prices in the newly-monopolistic market. See Myerson, supra, at 172.
2 See S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 37, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 381, 423. The readily apparent harm caused by dumping is the economic hardship
inflicted on domestic producers of goods similar to those dumped. See Fisher, supra note 1,
at 90-91. Simply stated, there is a decrease in the domestic producers' volume of sales to the
same extent as the increase in the dumper's volume of sales in the importing nation. See id.
The major retaliatory tactic against dumping is the imposition of a duty on the dumped
goods equal to the amount by which the foreign market value of the commodity exceeds the
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tion. The Court of International Trade 4 has exclusive jurisdiction
price charged for the dumped product in the United States. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982); see
also Note, Injury Determinations Under United States Antidumping Laws Before and Af-
ter the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 1076, 1077 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Injury Determinations]. The duty is imposed whenever it is found that (1) the
goods are being sold, or are likely to be sold in the United States at less than their fair value
and, (2) an American industry is materially injured, or the establishment of an industry in
the United States would be materially retarded. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982). For a summary of
the procedures involved in the imposition of an antidumping duty, see Note, Administering
the Revised Antidumping Law: Allocating Power Between the ITC and the Court of Inter-
national Trade, 2 VA. J. INT'L L. 883, 888-92 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Allocating Power].
One commentator has posited that the antidumping laws were enacted to punish the
dumper for charging higher prices in its home market, see Ehrenhaft, What the Antidump-
ing and Countervailing Duty Provisions of the Trade Agreements Act [Can] [Will]
[Should] Mean for the U.S. Trade Policy, 11 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 1361, 1363 (1979),
because these sales enable the foreign producer to offer the merchandise at lower prices in
the United States and injure American competitors, id. Thus, if the foreign producer were
to lower its home market prices to the level of those charged in the United States, it could
not afford to "dump" merchandise into this country. Id.
" See, e.g., Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5, 13, 19, 26 and 28 U.S.C.); Revenue Act of 1916, 15
U.S.C. § 72 (1982); Antidumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171 (1976), repealed by
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, 193; see W. WARES, supra
note 1, at 1.
The Revenue Act of 1916 was the first attempt by Congress to control dumping on the
American market. See Injury Determinations, supra note 2, at 1078. The Act was a crimi-
nal statute making it illegal to import goods into the United States at a price "substantially
less" than their actual value if the importer had the intent to destroy or injure an American
industry. See 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1982). The Act provided that an injured party could sue in
district court and recover treble damages. See id. This statute has never been invoked in a
suit brought by the Federal government, see Injury Determinations, supra note 2, at 1078,
largely because of the difficulty in "proving the requisite intent," Prosterman, Withholding
of Appraisment [sic] Under the United States Anti-dumping Act: Protectionism or Un-
fair-Competition Law?, 41 WASH. L. REV. 315, 316 n.4 (1966); see Myerson, supra note 1, at
173.
The Antidumping Act of 1921 differed substantially from the Revenue Act of 1916. See
Injury Determinations, supra note 2, at 1079. The 1921 Act provided for the assessment of
equalizing duties rather than the use of criminal sanctions, and added a requirement that
the injured party demonstrate that American industry was either injured or likely to be
injured by the alleged dumping. See Anthony, The American Response to Dumping From
Capitalist and Socialist Economies-Substantive Premises, and Restructured Procedures
After the 1967 GATT Code, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 159, 161-62 (1969).
In addition to procedural modifications relating to jurisdictional matters, see infra
notes 5-6 and accompanying text, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (1979 Act) effected
substantive changes in the area of antidumping. See Allocating Power, supra note 2, at 892-
93. One such change was that under the new law, "material injury" rather than mere "in-
jury" was required before an antidumping duty would be imposed. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673
(1982). The 1979 Act also incorporated into federal law the international antidumping code.
See S. REP. No. 249, supra note 2, at 1, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE: CONG. & AD. NEWS at
387. The code, a product of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN),
had as its primary objective the reduction or "harmonization" of "nontariff barriers" to
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to review decisions of the International Trade Administration
(ITA) 5 rendered pursuant to these antidumping laws.' While the
trade. Id. at 2, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 387.
' The Customs Court was renamed the Court of International Trade by the Customs
Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 101, 94 Stat. 1727 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 251
(1982)) (1980 Act), to describe more accurately "the court's clarified and expanded jurisdic-
tion and its new judicial functions relating to international trade," H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3729, 3732.
The Customs Court began as an administrative body known as the Board of General
Appraisers. See Act of June 10, 1890, ch. 407, § 12, 26 Stat. 131, 136 ; H.R. REP. No. 1235,
supra, at 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3729. The Board was a unit
of the Treasury Department and was responsible for the review of decisions by Customs
officials pertaining to duties and valuation of imported merchandise. H.R. REP. No. 1235,
supra, at 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3729. In 1926, the Board
was renamed the Customs Court, Act of May 28, 1926, ch. 411, 44 Stat. 669, retaining the
same functions, duties and jurisdiction. Id.; see H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra, at 18, reprinted
in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3730. The Customs Court, which had been estab-
lished as an Article I court, was given Article III jurisdiction in 1956. See 28 U.S.C. § 251
(1982). The Customs Courts Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-271, 84 Stat. 274 (codified at scat-
tered sections of 9 and 28 U.S.C.), made substantial procedural reforms, but failed to resolve
issues concerning the jurisdiction and powers of the Customs Court, see Rodino, The Cus-
toms Courts Act of 1980, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 459, 460 (1981).
The Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (codified at scat-
tered sections of 28 U.S.C.) is the most recent expansion of the jurisdiction and remedial
powers of the court. See Recent Development, The Customs Courts Act of 1980, 13 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 281, 282-83 (1981). Prior to 1980, the complexity of international trade
problems and the relevant statutes made it difficult for plaintiffs to determine in advance
whether the Customs Court had jurisdiction over particular cases. Id. at 285-86. Conse-
quently, district courts dismissed many cases for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the
Customs Court. See, e.g., Flintkote Co. v. Blumenthal, 469 F. Supp. 115, 124, 126
(N.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 596 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1979); J.C. Penney Co. v. United States Dep't of
Treasury, 319 F. Supp. 1023, 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 439 F.2d 63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 869 (1971); Cottman Co. v. Dailey, 20 F. Supp. 142, 150 (D. Md. 1937), afj'd, 94
F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1938); see Rodino, supra, at 461; Note, The Customs Courts Act of 1980, 7
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 85, 95 (1982); Recent Development, supra, at 285-86.
The International Trade Administration, a subdivision of the Department of Com-
merce, has been granted "general operational responsibility for major nonagricultural inter-
national trade functions of the United States Government, including. . . the administration
of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, . . . and monitoring compliance with in-
ternational trade agreements to which the United States is a party." See Reorg. Plan No. 3
of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 69, 273 (1979), reprinted in 19 U.S.C. § 2171, at 964 (1982).
In the antidumping context, the ITA decides, first, whether an antidumping duty inves-
tigation is warranted, see 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a)-(b) (1982), and, second, whether the mer-
chandise alleged to have been dumped is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States
at less than its fair value, see id. § 1673b(b)(1). After the ITA initiates an investigation, the
International Trade Commission (ITC) determines whether there is a reasonable indication
that an industry in the United States is materially injured. Id. § 1637b(a).
6 Jurisdiction to review such determinations is conferred on the Court of International
Trade by the Customs Courts Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1982). Section 1581(i) provides,
in pertinent part:
[Tihe Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil
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authority of the Court to review such determinations is explicit,7
the scope of its remedial powers is in dispute.8 Recently, in United
action commenced against the United States, its agencies, or its officers, that
arises out of any law of the United States providing for -
(2) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation of merchandise for
reasons other than the raising of revenue .
Id.
The 1979 Act was designed to provide greater access to the Customs Court for a larger
number of parties, greater opportunity for interlocutory judicial review of antidumping pro-
ceedings, and expedited appeals from ITA and ITC decisions. See S. REP. No. 249, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 245, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 381, 630. Provisions for
interlocutory review of ITA and ITC decisions in antidumping proceedings were intended to
provide an immediate opportunity for a party to obtain review of administrative determina-
tions. Id. at 245, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 631.
The 1979 Act also attempted to make the Customs Court (now the Court of Interna-
tional Trade) the proper forum for the resolution of antidumping disputes. See id. at 250,
reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 636.
1 See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(1)(A) (1982). Section 1516a(a)(1)(A) provides, in pertinent
part:
Within 30 days after the date of publication in the Federal Register of notice of-
(i) a determination by the Secretary or the administering authority .... not to
initiate an investigation,
an interested party who is a party to the proceeding in connection with which the
matter arises may commence an action in the United States Court of International
Trade . . . contesting any factual findings or legal conclusions upon which the
determination is based.
Id.
In addition to ITA decisions, the Court also is empowered to review material injury
determinations made by the ITC, see, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 573
F. Supp. 122, 124 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983); Armco, Inc. v. United States, 570 F. Supp. 51, 53
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1983); Alberta Gas Chems., Inc. v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 780, 789 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1981), trade adjustment assistance findings made by the Secretary of Labor, see,
e.g., Abbot v. Donovan, 570 F. Supp. 41, 46 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983); Miller v. Donovan, 568 F.
Supp. 760, 761 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983); Woodrum v. Donovan, 564 F. Supp. 826, 828 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1983), and classification decisions made by the Customs Service, see, e.g., Rohm &
Haas Co. v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 751, 759 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983); Wear Me Apparel
Co. v. United States, 511 F. Supp. 814, 816 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981).
A "determination" refers to an official decision made in the course of a proceeding. 19
C.F.R. § 353.11(c) (1982). The 1980 Act incorporates the provisions of the 1979 Act relating
to the scope and standard of judicial review in the context of dumping actions. See 28 U.S.C
§ 2640(b) (1982). The incorporation of these provisions was an attempt to eliminate some of
the confusion regarding the scope and standard of judicial review of such actions. Cohen,
The New United States Court of International Trade, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 277, 290
(1981).
' See Cohen, supra note 7, at 292. One commentator has suggested that the failure of
the 1980 Act to empower the Court to grant equitable relief in adjustment assistance actions
"indicates a substantial retreat in the general effort to increase the authority of the court."
Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2643(c)(2)-(4) (1982). This view appears to contradict Congress' intent
to expand the Court's remedial powers. See H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 61,
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States v. Roses Inc.,9 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 0
affirmed the Court's finding" that a decision by the ITA had been
tainted by ex parte contacts with the anticipated target of the in-
vestigation, but reversed the order of the Court mandating an in-
vestigation by the ITA and remanded the case for further
proceedings.'2
In Roses, the plaintiff, Roses Incorporated (Roses), an associa-
tion of American rose growers,' 3 filed an antidumping petition with
the ITA, alleging that roses were being exported from Colombia
and sold in the United States at less than fair value. 4 To support
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3729, 3772-73.
9 706 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
10 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created by the Federal Courts Im-
provement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified at scattered sections
of 5 and 28 U.S.C.). The creation of the Federal Circuit provided a forum for nationwide
appeals in areas of the law where Congress determined there was a special need for national
uniformity. S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 11, 14. The Federal Courts Improvements Act was intended to remedy the struc-
tural problems presented by the lack of stare decisis among the circuits, which deprived the
federal system of a means to provide reasonably prompt and "definitive answers to legal
questions of nationwide significance." Id. at 3, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 13.
The Federal Circuit differs from other federal courts of appeals in that its jurisdiction is
defined by subject matter rather than by geography. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 13. The new court assumed almost all of the appellate jurisdiction of
the two courts that it replaced, the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, id. at 2-3, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 12-13. The Federal
Circuit is authorized to review, inter alia, appeals from final decisions of the United States
Court of International Trade, and, in certain instances, district courts, as well as final deter-
minations of the ITC and the Secretary of Commerce. See Federal Courts Improvements
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 1295, 96 Stat. 25, 38 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1982)).
See Roses Inc. v. United States, 538 F. Supp. 418, 421-22 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982).
12 706 F.2d at 1570.
13 Id. at 1564.
14 Id. The petition was filed pursuant to the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §
1673a(b)(1) (1982). Id.; see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
Although "fair value" is not defined in the statute, the Commerce Department Regula-
tions equate the term with "foreign market value." See 19 C.F.R. § 353.1 (1984). Section
1677b of title 19 of the United States Code defines "foreign market value" as the price at
which the same or similar merchandise is sold or offered for sale in the exporter's principal
markets in wholesale quantities for home consumption. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1) (1982). If
the merchandise is not sold for home consumption, or if the amount sold for such use is
minimal, the foreign market value is the price at which the merchandise is offered for sale
by the exporting producer to countries other than the United States. Id. In addition, for the
purpose of calculating foreign market value, the prices described above are increased by the
cost of containers and shipping charges. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the calculation
of foreign market value, see 1 P. FELLER, U.S. CUSTOMS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE GUIDE §
18.03 (1984) and W. WARES, supra note 1, at 98-102.
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its allegations, Roses included with its petition a study of the rose
growing industry in Colombia and data from the Census Bureau of
the United States Department of Commerce.15 While the petition
was being considered, 16 the Department of Commerce received in-
formation from Colombian officials and from Asocolflores, a Co-
lombian rose growers association, that conflicted with the data sub-
mitted by Roses.1 7 On June 22, 1981, the ITA held an ex parte
meeting with the Economic Minister of the Colombian Embassy,
counsel for Asocolflores, and others, at which Roses' petition and
its deficiencies were discussed.' 8 After notifying Roses that the
proceedings would be terminated if the petition were not with-
drawn, the ITA dismissed the petition when Roses took no
action. 9
Roses filed suit on July 13, 1981, seeking a determination that,
because of the ex parte contacts, the decision of the ITA was un-
lawful.20 After reviewing the language of the Trade Agreements Act
of 1979 (1979 Act) and its legislative history, the Court held that
section 732 of the Act required only that the petition allege the
elements necessary for the imposition of an antidumping duty and
"B See 538 F. Supp. at 419. The information submitted by Roses attempted to calculate
a mean invoice price for sales of Colombian roses exported to the United States by using
statistics from the Census Bureau. Roses, 706 F.2d at 1570. The prices calculated by this
method were lower than those obtained by Roses in its own commissioned study of the
Colombian rose-growing industry, but the trade association submitted both reports as part
of the "information [reasonably] available" to it. Id.; see 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1) (1982).
11 See 538 F. Supp. at 419. The ITA has 20 days after the date of the filing of the
petition to determine whether the petition is sufficient to warrant the initiation of an inves-
tigation. Id.; see 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c) (1982). During this period, the ITA notified Roses'
attorney that the petition was defective and suggested that Roses modify it. 538 F. Supp. at
419. Roses then submitted additional information in support of its allegations. Id. In addi-
tion, Asocolflores, an association of Colombian rose growers, advised the Department of
Commerce that it was seeking disclosure of the Roses' study pursuant to the Freedom of
Information Act. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
17 538 F. Supp. at 419. The information submitted by Asocolflores differed with respect
to the number of workers employed in the rose-growing industry in Colombia and to the
bloom rate of the Colombian plants. Id.
8 Id. There was also a record of a telex from PROEXPO, an official trade agency of the
Colombian government, concerning Roses' petition. Id. The telex was examined at the meet-
ing, but was rejected and not included in the administrative record. Id.
,0 Id. The ITA explained to Roses that it could submit another petition to replace the
defective one. Id. The dismissal was based on grounds other than those urged by the outside
objectors. Roses, 706 F.2d at 1565.
2 538 F. Supp. at 419. Roses asserted that the ITA exceeded its statutory authority in
looking beyond the petition and supporting data in determining that the Colombian roses
were not being dumped. Id. The complaint alleged that the agency had solicited and consid-
ered information from Colombian officials. Id.
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contain information in support of its contentions.2 The Court
noted that Roses' allegations of less-than-fair-value sales and ma-
terial injury to the United States rose growing industry were sup-
ported adequately by the petition and the accompanying informa-
tion.22 Moreover, the Court observed that Congress intended the
ITA to consider only that information included in the petition
along with any supporting data and facts "within the public do-
main. '2 3 Thus, Judge Rao concluded that the ITA erred in using
information received from the Colombian officials in making its de-
termination not to institute the investigation.24 In addition, the
Court noted that the ITA had mistakenly required Roses to in-
clude data on the United States selling price in its petition.25 Con-
sequently, the Court ordered that the petition be reinstated and
that an investigation be commenced.26
On appeal, a divided Federal Circuit panel27 reversed that part
of the Court's decision ordering the initiation of an investigation,2 s
holding that it was an "abuse of authority for a CIT judge to sub-
21 Id. at 420. The Court, in an opinion by Judge Rao, stated that the legislative history
of the 1979 Act indicated that the framers intended the ITA to act upon, rather than dis-
cuss, petitions that allege the elements required for imposition of an antidumping duty and
that are supported by information reasonably available to the petitioner. Id.; see S. REP No.
249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 63, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 381, 449.
Furthermore, the Court cited legislative history that indicated that the petition require-
ments were not intended to be so rigorous as to prevent aggrieved parties from bringing
valid complaints. 538 F. Supp. at 420.
The Court quoted the wrong subsection of the pertinent provision. See id. at 420 n.1.
The Court quoted § 732(a), which refers to initiation of an investigation by the administer-
ing authority. Id. (§ 732(a) is codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a)). The proper provision is
section 1673a(b)(1), which provides, in pertinent part:
An antidumping proceeding shall be commenced whenever an interested
party... files a petition with the administering authority, on behalf of an indus-
try, which alleges the elements necessary for the imposition of the duty imposed
by section 1673 of this title, and which is accompanied by information reasonably
available to the petitioner supporting those allegations.
19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1) (1982) (emphasis added); see Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United
States, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 3, 7 (1982); Royal Business Machs., Inc. v. United States, 507 F.
Supp. 1007, 1010 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980), aff'd, 669 F.2d 692 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
22 538 F. Supp. at 421.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. Data on the United States selling price would be more relevant in the investiga-
tory stage of the proceedings. Id.
26 Id. at 422.
27 See 706 F.2d at 1564. Judge Smith joined Judge Nichols in the majority opinion,
with Judge Miller dissenting.
28 Id. at 1570.
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stitute his opinion for that of the agency. ' 29 Rather, the court
opined that the proper course of action would have been to remand
the case to the ITA for further consideration." Judge Nichols,
writing for the majority, affirmed the finding of the Court that a
decision to initiate an investigation or to dismiss a petition should
not be based on information acquired from anticipated targets dur-
ing the 20 days following the filing of the petition.31 Because the
ITA had received and considered such information, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the Court's finding that the proceedings were
unlawful.32
The second issue addressed by the majority was whether the
Court of International Trade erred in ordering the agency to initi-
ate the investigation.3 3 The Court maintained that Congress in-
tended agency expertise to be used in the examination and evalua-
tion of antidumping petitions.34 Judge Nichols also determined
that the Court of International Trade is never warranted in man-
dating that the ITA investigate a petition, even when, as in Roses,
29 Id. at 1569; see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971).
:1 706 F.2d at 1569. The court reasoned that, in the absence of bad faith, the fact that
administrators have been "mistaken in certain particulars,... is no warrant for taking out
of their hands the decision that is still for them to make." Id.
31 Id. at 1567-68. The court cited legislative history indicating that is was not the intent
of Congress to provide for an advocacy proceeding at the pre-investigative stage and that
information rebutting allegations contained in the petition should not be considered by the
ITA. See id. at 1566; 125 CONG. REC. 20, 172 (1979) (colloquy between Senator Ribicoff and
Senator Danforth).
32 706 F.2d at 1570. The court determined that despite a statutory requirement of
maintaining a record of ex parte meetings with interested parties, see 19 U.S.C. §
1677f(a)(3) (1982), such meetings were not proper during the preliminary stage in which a
petition is being considered, 702 F.2d at 1567-68.
33 706 F.2d at 1568-71. The Federal Circuit construed the holding of the Court of Inter-
national Trade to be that the agency was obliged to commence the investigation, even if it
knew that such action was unwarranted, whenever the petition contained the necessary alle-
gations. See id. at 1568. Although the court appears to have concluded that such a standard
is inappropriate, it is suggested that the position of the Court of International Trade was a
correct interpretation of the legislative history of § 732(c)(1) of the Trade Agreements Act
of 1979. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(1) (1982); S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 62-63,
reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 381, 448-49.
:4 706 F.2d at 1568. Although the court referred to the expertise of the agency in deal-
ing with antidumping matters, it failed to discuss the expertise of the Court of International
Trade. See id. A primary goal of the Customs Courts Act of 1980 was to reemphasize and
clarify Congress' intent that the expertise and national jurisdiction of the Court be used to
resolve conflicts and disputes arising out of the tariff and trade laws. See H.R. REP. No.
1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3729,
3739.
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the original proceedings are tainted by illegality. s5
Judge Miller dissented from the latter part of the majority
opinion.3s Judge Miller observed that Congress expected the ITA
to reject "only those [petitions] which are clearly frivolous, not rea-
sonably supported by the facts alleged or which omit important
facts which are reasonably available to the petitioner."37 The dis-
sent noted that Congress did not intend the ITA to weigh the cred-
ibility of conflicting evidence at the preliminary stage.38 Rather,
Judge Miller determined that the evaluation of information pro-
vided by the petition should be left to the investigatory stage."
The dissent reasoned that the allegations of the plaintiff's petition
satisfied the statutory requirements and that the information sup-
plied by the plaintiff tended to support the allegations.40
By limiting the scope of the equitable powers of the Court of
International Trade, the Federal Circuit's holding in Roses appears
to be inconsistent with the intent of Congress in enacting both the
1979 Act 41 and the Customs Courts Act of 1980 (1980 Act).42 Be-
cause the statutes being construed are relatively new,43 it is incum-
bent upon the Federal Circuit to establish the proper basis for the
Court's authority. This Comment will discuss the Roses decision
and offer an alternative approach that is more consonant with the
legislative intent of the framers of the 1979 and 1980 Acts.
The Court of International Trade has the power to declare un-
lawful any preliminary antidumping determination that is "arbi-
trary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
35 706 F.2d at 1569. The court added that even if the Court of International Trade's
criticisms of the position of the ITA were valid, it would have been more appropriate for the
Court not to interfere judicially until after the plaintiff had been rebuffed in an attempt to
submit an amended petition. Id. at 1570.
36 Id. at 1571 (Miller, J., dissenting in part). Judge Miller agreed with the majority that
the receipt by the ITA of information from the Colombian officials was illegal. See id.
(Miller, J., dissenting in part).
37 Id. at 1572 (Miller, J., dissenting in part) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 51 (1979)). Judge Miller quoted legislative history indicating that Congress regarded
the requirements for a sufficient petition to be analogous to those needed to state a claim
for the purpose of civil litigation. See 706 F.2d at 1572 (Miller, J., dissenting in part).
38 See id. at 1573 (Miller, J., dissenting in part).
8 See id. at 1573-74 (Miller, J., dissenting in part).
40 See id. at 1573 (Miller, J., dissenting in part).
41 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 1,14 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 5, 13, 19, 26, 28 U.S.C.); see supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
42 Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (codified in scattered
sections of 5, 16, 19, and 28 U.S.C.).
43 See 706 F.2d at 1565.
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cordance with law."' 44 In making such a finding, the Court, like
other courts reviewing an administrative action, is to consider
whether the decision of the administering authority was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors of the case and whether the
agency made a "clear error of judgment. '45 In Roses, both the
Court of International Trade and the Federal Circuit held that the
proceedings conducted by the ITA were rendered unlawful by the
receipt of prejudicial information by the agency.46 However, the
44 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(A) (1982); cf. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1982) (uniform standard of
review applied to agency actions generally). A different standard from that employed in a
preliminary antidumping determination is used by the Court when reviewing either the im-
position of an antidumping duty or a determination that merchandise is not being sold for
less than fair value. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B) (1982). In such a case, the Court is to
hold unlawful any determination or finding found to be "unsupported by substantial evi-
dence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Id.; see Industrial Fasteners
Group, Am. Importers Ass'n v. United States, 710 F.2d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1983); ASG
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 610 F.2d 770, 779 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
4' See Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285
(1974); Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 238 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976); Albert Elia Bldg. Co. v. Sioux City, Iowa, 418 F. Supp. 176, 179
(N.D. Iowa 1976). Under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, the court is to conduct an
in-depth review and decide whether, inter alia, the agency followed the necessary proce-
dural requirements. City of Benton Harbor v. Richardson, 429 F. Supp. 1096, 1102 (W.D.
Mich. 1977). It has been suggested that the "arbitrary and capricious" test involves more
than just review of the procedural elements of a case; the requirement that the facts under-
lying the decision be examined to assure that the agency considered relevant factors and did
not make any "clear error of judgment" goes to the substance of the decision. See Lockhart,
Essay in Law-Irrational, but not Arbitrary: Should Reviewing Courts Draw So Fine a
Line?, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 649, 651-52; see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). Citizens to Preserve Overton Park involved a decision by
the Secretary of Transportation to authorize the expenditure of federal funds for the con-
struction of a highway through a public park in Tennessee. See 401 U.S. at 406. The Su-
preme Court asserted that the reviewing court is to consider whether the Secretary properly
construed his authority to approve such an expenditure. See id. at 416. It is suggested that
such an analysis may be applied to the situation in Roses. By deciding that the ITA is not to
consider the merits of the petition at the preliminary stage, the Court of International
Trade implied that the agency had overstepped, or misconstrued, its statutory authority to
determine the sufficiency of the petition. Such a decision arguably is within the purview of
the reviewing court's authority under the Overton Park guidelines and does not encroach on
the "discretion" of the administrative agency.
It is further suggested that the general rule that a court must not substitute its judg-
ment for that of the agency is, for all practical purposes, inapposite in the context of review
of a preliminary antidumping determination. By ordering the initiation of an investigation,
the court returns the matter to the ITA for a determination of whether there have been
sales at less than fair value. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(2) (1982). If the agency finds that
there have been no such sales, it has the authority to terminate the investigation. Id. §
1673d(c)(2). Thus, the decision as to whether the proceedings will continue remains within
the discretion of the ITA.
46 See 706 F.2d at 1570; 538 F. Supp. at 418.
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courts disagreed regarding the extent to which the Court of Inter-
national Trade can act in remedying such an indiscretion. 7
In holding that the Court was without authority to order the
initiation of an antidumping investigation,48 it is suggested that
the Federal Circuit failed to consider the powers expressly granted
to the Court of International Trade in section 2643 of the 1980
Act. Among the remedies specifically warranted by section 2643 is
injunctive relief.4 9 In addition, as the legislative history and ex-
press language of the 1980 Act indicate that the Court has power
coextensive with that of the federal district courts, 50 it is suggested
that an examination of the standards applied by these courts in
granting injunctive relief is appropriate."
Generally, courts employ one of two alternative tests to deter-
mine whether injunctive relief is proper in a given case. The first
4 See 706 F.2d at 1570.
48 Id. at 1569.
• 28 U.S.C. § 2643 (1982). Section 2643 provides, in pertinent part:
Except as provided in paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) of this subsection, the
Court of International Trade may... order any... form of relief that is appropri-
ate in a civil action, including, but not limited to, declaratory judgments, orders of
remand, injunctions, and writs of mandamus and prohibition.
Id. § 2643(c)(1).
Prior to the 1980 Act, it had been generally held that the Customs Court did not have
the authority to render equitable relief. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 67
Cust. Ct. 328, 331 (1971), aff'd, 60 C.C.P.A. 85, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); Horton v.
Humphrey, 146 F. Supp. 819, 821 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 352 U.S. 921 (1956). Following the passage
of the 1980 Act, however, the court began to exercise broader remedial powers. See, e.g.,
American Air Parcel Forwarding Co. v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 47, 52 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1981); Wear Me Apparel Corp. v. United States, 511 F. Supp. 814, 817 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1981); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 505 F. Supp. 216, 218 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980).
50 See H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 61, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3729, 3772-73. The intent of Congress in enacting § 2643(c)(1) was to grant the
Court "remedial powers co-extensive with those of a federal district court." Id. This provi-
sion was regarded as a general grant of authority to the Court to authorize any form of relief
that is appropriate under the circumstances. Id., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 3772; see Wear Me Apparel Corp. v. United States, 511 F. Supp. 814, 817-18 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1981) (dictum) (court empowered "to do equity" regarding claims concerning
administration and enforcement of restrictions on importation).
Section 1585 of the 1980 Act provides that "[the Court of International Trade shall
possess all the powers in law and equity of, or as conferred by statute upon, a district court
of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1585 (1982) (emphasis added).
51 The legislative history of 19 U.S.C. § 2643 (1982) indicates that "[w]hen a party re-
quests the court to grant injunctive relief, the court is to be guided by the same factors
utilized by a federal district court when it considers a request for a preliminary or perma-
nent injunction." H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 61, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3729, 3773; see American Air Parcel Forwarding Co. v. United States,
515 F. Supp. 47, 52 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981).
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test seeks to determine whether the party seeking relief has
demonstrated both probable success on the merits and possible ir-
reparable injury.2 The second test focuses on whether there has
been a showing of sufficiently serious questions going to the merits
of the case and whether there exists a "balance of hardships" tip-
ping decidedly toward the party seeking relief.53
Because the Court of International Trade and a number of cir-
cuit courts of appeals have recently adopted the latter test,54 it is
suggested that the application of such a standard would be appro-
priate in examining Roses. Under this standard a plaintiff would
12 See, e.g., Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982) (court refused
to grant injunction to compel prison to provide free legal supplies to indigent prisoners);
Pabst Brewing Co. v. Kalmanovitz, 551 F. Supp. 882, 895 (D. Del. 1982) (court granted
preliminary injunction to prevent bidder from consummating partial tender offer); Irving J.
Dorfman Co. v. Borlan Indus., 309 F. Supp. 21, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (court refused to grant
injunction to halt alleged copyright infringement).
13 See, e.g., Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 195-96 (4th Cir.
1977); Angell v. Zinsser, 473 F. Supp. 488, 494 (D. Conn. 1979); Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F.
Supp. 1235, 1239-40 (D. Conn. 1978); cf. Maryland Undercoating Co. v. Payne, 603 F.2d 477,
481 (4th Cir. 1979) (decision to be based on "flexible interplay" among various factors). In
Blackwelder Furniture, the Fourth Circuit held that a standard requiring a strong showing
of probable success on the merits is not to be used by a trial court on application for a
preliminary injunction, but is appropriate when applied to the issuance of an appellate stay
pending review of an administrative order. See 550 F.2d at 193-95. The court asserted that
the proper trial court standard for injunctive relief is the "balance of hardship" test. See id.
at 196. Moreover, the court added that the public interest should always be considered. See
id.
In Roses, the Court of International Trade, in denying the defendant's motion for a stay
pending appeal, asserted that the public interest to be served is "to correct situations where
merchandise is being imported at less than fair value with resultant injury to American
industries and to give relief to injured American industries by way of increased duties to
neutralize the harmful effects of the dumped imported merchandise." Roses Inc. v. United
States, No. 82-91 (Ct. Int'l Trade Oct. 27, 1982) (available on LEXIS, Itrade library, CIT
file). This public interest, the Court held, will be served by the initiation of the investigation
to determine whether the plaintiffs are being injured because of the dumping of roses. Id.
I See American Air Parcel Forwarding Co. v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 47, 53 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1981). The court in American Air Parcel cited Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 618
F.2d 1029, 1032-33 (4th Cir. 1980) for its use of a "sliding scale" method of determining
whether injunctive relief should be granted. See American Air Parcel, 515 F. Supp. at 53.
Under this theory, "the showing of likelihood of success on the merits is in inverse propor-
tion to the severity of the injury the moving party will sustain without injunctive relief, i.e.,
the greater the hardship the lesser the showing." Id.
Other circuits that have adopted the "balance of hardships" standard include the Sec-
ond Circuit, see Mattel, Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway Int'l, Inc., 724 F.2d 357, 359-61 (2d Cir.
1983), the Sixth Circuit, see Friendship Materials, Inc. v. Michigan Brick, Inc., 679 F.2d 100,
104 (6th Cir. 1982), the Eighth Circuit, see Dataphase Sys. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109,
113-14 (8th Cir. 1981), and the Ninth Circuit, see Ebel v. City of Corona, 698 F.2d 390, 392-
93 (9th Cir. 1983).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:862
satisfy the initial inquiry as to whether there are serious questions
going to the merits by showing that there is "some reasonable
chance of success even though it could not be shown that there was
a likelihood or probability of success."5 5 By filing a petition alleg-
ing the factors needed for the imposition of an antidumping duty
and submitting evidence in support of its contentions, it is submit-
ted that Roses met the threshold requirement for the imposition of
injunctive relief.5 6
It is further submitted that the second requirement, a balance
of hardships tipping decidedly toward the plaintiff,57 also has been
met. Under this standard, the likelihood of irreparable harm to the
plaintiff if the requested relief is denied is weighed against the
likelihood of irreparable harm to the opposing party in the event
the relief is granted. 8 In Roses, it is apparent that if the investiga-
tion is not ordered, the plaintiff will continue to be injured,59 since
the Colombian exporter will continue to sell roses at prices lower
than those offered by the plaintiff.6 0 Moreover, although the ITA
may be compelled to investigate a claim it believes to be unwar-
ranted, the agency will suffer little, if any, irreparable injury, since
it merely will be initiating an antidumping investigation using a
" Saad v. Shell Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. 114, 116 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
50 Congress intended § 1673a(b)(1) "to result in investigations being commenced unless
... the petitioner does not provide information supporting the allegations .... S. REP. No.
249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 63, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 381, 449
(emphasis added). It is suggested that the use of the word "unless" by Congress indicates
that there exists a type of presumption in favor of the initiation of an investigation that
may be rebutted only upon a showing that the petitioner failed to provide information in
support of its allegations.
'1 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
'8 See Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 196 (4th Cir. 1977).
'9 It should be noted that, after the case was remanded to the ITA, an investigation was
initiated and the agency issued a finding that Colombian exporters were, indeed, dumping
fresh-cut roses into the American market. See Wall St. J., Mar. 12, 1984 at 20, col. 4. The
Commerce Department reported that imports of Colombian roses had increased nearly 63%
from the previous year, and that the roses were selling in the United States at an average
price of approximately 20% below that being charged for them in Colombia. Id.
It should also be noted that, in most antidumping cases, time is an important consider-
ation. Ultimate resolution of the issue in the petitioner's favor may be rendered irrelevant
by a substantial delay, because irreversible injury may have been suffered during the in-
terim period. See S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 245, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 381, 631.
00 The question of whether the economic harm to Roses outweighs the benefits inuring
to the American rose consumer is not relevant to this discussion and is therefore beyond the
scope of this Comment. See J. VINER, supra note 1, at 138.
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staff that has expertise in such matters.6 1 Furthermore, Asocol-
flores, the Colombian exporter, will be unharmed by the investiga-
tion,- since, as the Federal Circuit observed, liquidation of duties
will continue at the old rate until affirmative preliminary determi-
nations are made.6 2 Because both requirements for the imposition
of injunctive relief have been met, and since the power to issue
such relief also permits the Court to compel affirmative action,63 it
is suggested that the Court was within its power in ordering the
ITA to commence the investigation.
Finally, it is suggested that public policy considerations pro-
vide further support for a less restrictive interpretation of the eq-
uity powers of the Court of International Trade.6 4 A primary objec-
tive of the 1980 Act was to inform aggrieved parties that they
could seek redress through the judicial process, assured that their
complaints would be examined on the merits and that the Court
would be empowered to afford them the proper relief.6 5 It is sug-
gested that if the limitations imposed by the Roses court continue
to be imposed in future actions, the Court of International Trade
will be denied powers expressly granted to it and aggrieved parties
will be denied rights intended to be conferred upon them.
" See Roses Inc. v. United States, No. 82-91 (Ct. Int'l Trade Oct. 27, 1982) (available
on LEXIS, I Trade Library, CIT file). If the investigation proves to have been unwarranted,
the agency still will not have been harmed, and its reputation will not have been damaged.
See United States v. Roses Inc., 706 F.2d 1563, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
62 Id. The court added that Asocolflores could explain to its customers that the initia-
tion of the investigation was an insignificant event, since Roses had previously filed similar
dumping complaints. Id.
"' See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 440-41 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977) (district court imposed mandatory hiring quotas on Chicago police
department); Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583, 590 (5th Cir.) (district court ordered
registration of Negro voters who were denied registration on discriminatory basis), aff'd, 371
U.S. 37 (1962); Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 377-78 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (Im-
migration Service directed to provide Salvadoran aliens with information advising them of
specific rights).
It is suggested that the public interest will be served by the Court ordering an inves-
tigation, inasmuch as the existence of a federal statute both prohibiting the alleged acts and
enumerating the elements of the violation "constitutes added weight in favor of precaution-
ary relief." See Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 197 (4th Cir.
1977).
10 See Hearings on S.1654 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machin-
ery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1979) (statement of
David M. Cohen). The Customs Courts Act "make[s] it clear that, in those civil actions
within its jurisdiction, the court possesses the authority to grant the relief required to rem-
edy the injury suffered by a plaintiff." Id.
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CONCLUSION
The equitable powers of the Court of International Trade are
only now beginning to take on definite form. Because of its appel-
late jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit plays
perhaps the most important role in determining how these powers
will develop. By allowing the Court to exercise the powers ex-
pressly granted to it, the Federal Circuit can contribute to both the
proper delineation of the Court's authority and the proper admin-
istration of antidumping legislation.
Kevin M. Berry
